In the large majority of cases, social exclusion is caused by a lack of economic participation and in particular by chronic joblessness. This paper looks at policies and programs to overcome joblessness. Programs that increase individuals' capacities are important, but they cannot be widely effective in increasing participation if there is a shortage of jobs available for people to fill. The first half of the paper surveys policies to increase the demand by employers for workers. At times like the present, when employment is increasing substantially, programs to build capacities can be much more effective in increasing economic and social participation.
2.Involuntary chronic joblessness as a cause of social exclusion
Even though the term social exclusion is usually taken to mean more than poverty, involuntary chronic joblessness is the major cause of both poverty and social exclusion.
"Employment lies at the core of individuals' perception and experience of economic security versus economic vulnerability [and] social participation versus social exclusion" (United Nations, 2003, p. 51.) In the case of Australia, Saunders (2002) sets out how lack of paid work (including lack of successful self employment) is the most important direct cause of poverty and social exclusion. Saunders estimates that an income unit (roughly a family) with an unemployed person as head is almost ten times more likely to be in poverty than an income unit in which the head is employed. Other studies produce similar results (see e.g. Harding and Richardson, 1998) .
Obviously, the longer or the more frequently a person is unemployed, the more likely it is that the unemployment will cause poverty. However, in many cases it is not being unemployed as officially measured that causes poverty. It is being without a job that has paid remuneration that is the problem. Joblessness is a better word to use than unemployment. To be included in the official tally of unemployed one has to be actively looking for work. The jobless include those who have given up searching for paid employment because they have given up hope of finding any and hence are not counted as unemployed. It also includes those who are known as job seekers marginally attached to the labour force. These are people who want a job, are available to start work, have looked for work sometime in the previous 12 months but, for whatever reason, are not currently looking for work. In addition to the jobless there are those who are employed part time, perhaps for very few hours a week, but are unable to find more work although they would like to work more. On the other hand, the straightforward meaning of joblessness includes those without a job who have no desire to work, e.g., the majority of old age pensioners. Hence I use the phase 'involuntary chronic joblessness' to describe those whose joblessness is likely to lead to poverty and social exclusion. Only about half of those who suffer from involuntary chronic joblessness are officially counted as unemployed. If the underemployed are added to the involuntarily jobless, the total number is about three times the number of officially unemployed (Mitchell and Carlson, 2001 ).
Chronic joblessness is important, not only as a cause of social exclusion but because being excluded from a job is itself often a hurtful form of exclusion in our society in which one's work role is often a major part of self identity. Moreover, many men still perceive failure to be a family breadwinner to be failure as a male person.
Policies to reduce joblessness
It is helpful to group policies to reduce joblessness into four categories. The first is policies which increase the demand for workers. More often than not these policies are a necessary complement to those in the other categories and they will be discussed at length in this address.
Secondly, there are policies that increase the skills and the motivation to work of those without jobs. Much of the focus of the conference will be about these and there has also been emphasis on such policies for a decade or so in economics, where they are known as active labour market policies. Martin (2000) is a good survey of what economists know, and do not know, about such policies.
Policies that reduce disincentives to seeking and accepting paid work are also important. Monetary disincentives, called poverty traps, have been discussed in the economic literature for decades. Fashion has changed and this area is now more often known as welfare to work policies. An authoritative discussion of them can be found in OECD (2000, Part 4) and Ingles and Oliver (2000) On the one side are neoclassical economists who hold that, if some shock increases unemployment, a capitalist economy will automatically return in a relatively short period of time to a minimum rate of unemployment that is sustainable given current institutions, the socalled "natural" rate of unemployment. If this "natural" rate is higher than society should tolerate, the solution is to change institutions. Usually neoclassical economists advocate deregulating the labour market, which means reducing or abolishing minimum wage rates, other regulations and union power.
On the other side, Keynesian economists maintain that frequently not only will the total demand for goods and services in an economy (or aggregate demand) be insufficient to provide employment for all those seeking jobs, but also that private market sector forces will not remedy this situation. It is necessary for the government to increase aggregate demand through macroeconomic policy, especially monetary and fiscal policy and perhaps direct job creation in the public sector.
The neoclassical view of the causes of unemployment is based on a model in which there is perfect competition throughout the economy. No reputable economist believes that the conditions for perfect competition exist in any actual economy, but the neoclassical economists consider that departures from perfect competition are not important enough to invalidate the use of the model as a tool for analysing aggregate employment and unemployment. Keynesians think that departures from perfect competition are so widespread that the neoclassical model is useless as a basis for policy in this area.
Because policies in the first category are controversial more discussion of them is necessary and this is also desirable for another reason. Policies to increase the demand for workers are the most important way to reduce joblessness. Other policies can certainly help individuals and for that reason alone are valuable. But they work best in reducing joblessness when the demand for workers is growing. It is no good making people ready for work and attractive to employers if there are no jobs for them to go to.
It may seem strange to emphasise this when the Australian economy is still growing relatively rapidly and the unemployment rate is the lowest it has been for over a decade. The trouble is that Australians have become too complacent about unemployment and joblessness generally. In August 2004 the rate of unemployment nationally was 5.7 percent. This was after two decades of strong economic growth yet it is higher than the average rate of unemployment over the whole of the twentieth century. What is worse is that in the first quarter of the 20 th century unemployment in Australia averaged under 5 percent (Borland and Kennedy 1998) . Now, despite our much increased knowledge of economics and many more tools of economic policy, after one of the longest periods of uninterrupted economic growth in our history, we think it a great achievement that unemployment has fallen to 5.7 percent.
There is still a major need for policies to increase the demand for workers.
Policies to increase the demand for workers (a) Deregulating the labour market
Neoclassical economists believe that unemployment in the economy tends fairly quickly to a "natural" rate of unemployment. However, this "natural" rate is not immutably fixed but reflects institutions in the economy. Therefore, they argue that the only way to achieve a permanent reduction in unemployment is to change institutions and, in particular, to deregulate the labour market.
Justifying itself on the basis of neoclassical theory, the Howard Government has pushed hard for two forms of labour market deregulation, relaxing employment protection through unfair dismissal laws and abolishing, or reducing the scope of, laws that encourage or help union activity, including the traditional Australian system of conciliation and arbitration.
The economic literature gives little support to the view that in Australia either job protection or union activities have been major factors in adding to the average level of unemployment.
For example, after a careful and thorough study across 20 OECD countries Nickell concludes "Labor market rigidities that do not appear to have serious implications for average levels of unemployment include the following: … strict employment protection legislation and general legislation on labor market standards; … high levels of unionization and union coverage, so long as they are offset by high levels of coordination in wage bargaining, particularly among employers." (Nickell, 1997, p.72, emphasis added) Nickell's conclusion is not surprising. In the European Union the same labour market laws apply equally to all Member States, but there are states that have been notably successful in boosting employment and keeping unemployment low as well as others that have been very unsuccessful. This suggests that "employment problems are not caused by excessive labour market regulations" (Larsson, 2000, p. 35) .
As far as union activity is concerned Nickell finds that greater union coverage does tend to raise unemployment when there is little coordination of wage bargaining activities between unions and employers. Nickell's explanation is that uncoordinated union-dominated systems create "an additional source of inflationary pressure that requires more unemployment to quash it" (p.68).
The conclusions of Nickell's article suggests that, while the reduction in importance of the coordinating function of the Australian conciliation and arbitration system may be unfortunate, in general labour market regulation is not a major problem in Australia as far as unemployment is concerned. This is supported by work done in Australia. Sloan and Wooden (1998) argue that labour market outcomes have been much the same in Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom, yet in the last two mentioned countries the labour market is much more deregulated than it is in Australia. Gregory (2000) points out that, although the USA has the best performance with respect to employment growth over the last 40 years, the UK and Australian experience were the same until 1980, but "during and after the Thatcher reforms, the UK employment performance deteriorates relative to Australia" (p.115, emphasis in the original). After its reforms, New Zealand did even worse than the UK.
While many neoclassical economists in Australia do not disagree with Nichols'
analysis outlined above, all neoclassical economists unite in concern about one type of regulation, minimum wage laws. While in Australia at least the desirability of minimum wage laws is not an issue, there is concern that the level of minimum wages may be set too high.
Reducing the actual money value of minimum wages is not advocated because of the political and industrial relations problems but a number of economists have advocated allowing the real value of minimum wages to decline by freezing them or perhaps only by increasing them at a lower rate than the rate of inflation. However, the empirical evidence reviewed in the following paragraphs is that a reduction in the price of labour (real wages) will only have a small effect, if any at all, on the amount demanded. Very large, socially undesirable, economically disruptive and politically impossible reductions are necessary to have a noticeable effect.
Studies of the responsiveness of the amount of labour demanded when there is a change in wage levels (the elasticity of demand for labour) can be made at the firm or industry level and are called micro studies. Alternatively, they can be made at an economy wide, or macro, level. Micro studies all show an elasticity of demand for labour that is close to zero.
The majority of micro studies done before 1982 found elasticities of demand for the labour of teenagers or young adults close to zero (Brown, Gilroy and Kohen 1982) . Moreover, there was no convincing evidence that a cut in the minimum wage for older workers would increase their employment at all. In studies made in the 1980s and 1990s the pattern was for estimated effects of a rise in the minimum wage to be the same or smaller than those made earlier. Moreover, Card and Kreuger (1994,1995) found elasticities that were not only zero but sometimes positive, i.e. rises in the minimum wage increased employment. This started an immense controversy but neither side disputed that, positive or negative, the elasticities were close to zero.
There have been fewer studies at the macro level and the evidence is less clearcut.
Moreover, reviewing estimates of the elasticity of demand for labour is less straightforward at the macro level. It is more difficult to compare studies that cover different categories of workers (e.g. total employment, private sector employment, male employment). More often there are doubts about the sample. For example, in Australia there appears to have been a break in the data at the end of the 1970s (Debelle and Vickery 1998) , so that studies using data from both before and after that date need to be interpreted carefully.
The most influential Australian macro study, that of Debelle and Vickery (1998) , Other Australian studies using data from before 1978 often have greater estimated elasticities than this. However, as noted above, there appears to be a break in the data around 1978 and there are good arguments for using data that starts after that year. Studies that do this report results consistent with Debelle and Vickery's estimate of an elasticity of -0.4. This is noticeably greater than the consensus of micro studies. Nevertheless it is still small.
(b) Keynesian policies to reduce joblessness
Unlike the case of neoclassical policies, Keynesian policies are well supported by empirical evidence that they can increase output and employment (Nevile, 2000) . However, there is also evidence that Keynesian policies may have undesirable side effects. These side effects are likely to be worse and are harder to deal with in a global economy leading some to argue that Keynesian policies are now obsolete.
The deregulation and integration of financial markets around the world has given financial markets considerable influence on government policy. These markets now have great power in determining the exchange rate, and the exchange rate has such a widespread influence on the economy that, in many countries, governments must be constantly looking over their shoulder with concern about the effects of policy actions on financial markets.
The practical effect of this is not necessarily that national sovereignty in policy making must be superseded by tailoring policies to please financial markets. While there have been assertions that this is the case, empirical studies suggest that "governments still have policy choices and fiscal policy may be the most important instrument for choice" (Keohane and Milner, 1996 p.248) . The selection of fiscal policy is because monetary policy operates through influencing interest rates and, with the capital mobility that is part of globalisation, interest rates and exchange rates are closely linked constraining the ability to change interest rates.
Traditional arguments against the use of fiscal policy, still held by politicians in Australia, maintain that budget deficits increase interest rates, but the analytical evidence is dubious and so far empirical evidence does not support the proposition either (Nevile 2000) .
Current arguments against the use of expansionary fiscal policy rely not on analytical economic arguments leading to hypotheses that can be tested by standard methods but on arguments about how businessmen, especially those in financial markets, would react to the use of fiscal policy. The key argument is that budget deficits will lead financial markets to fear an exchange rate depreciation (Kriesler and Nevile, 2003) . If a large depreciation occurs and is perceived to be undesirable, interest rates will have to be increased, perhaps dramatically, offsetting the expansionary effects of a budget deficit. Financial markets prefer price stability, or at least no large increases in the inflation rate which will usually lead to a rise in interest rates and a consequent fall in the value of financial assets. Thus, it is not surprising that financial markets' spokesmen argue against fiscal deficits. Conventional wisdom still holds that deficits are inflationary. In most circumstances this is not directly the case, but if deficits do increase employment and economic activity they will put downward pressure on the exchange rate, which does tend to increase prices. Preventing a fall in the exchange rate will again probably require rise in interest rates.
However, events in the last few years suggest that international financial markets now pay less attention to economic analysis. This type of example reduces the value of following any systematic rules to keep the approval of international financial markets. Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy for any government (except that of the United States) to ignore the attitudes of financial markets altogether when framing fiscal policy. A compromise must be found. It may be even more costly to tolerate high unemployment rather than take actions that could be thought to upset financial markets.
In any case some fiscal policy action can be taken to expand employment without having a budget deficit. An increase in government expenditure usually has more expansionary effect than the contractionary effect of an equal sized increase in taxation revenue, thus stimulating economic activity and employment when both are increased by the same amount. In addition government expenditure can be biased towards labour intensive areas. Keynesian policies to reduce joblessness still have a vital role to play.
A case study: Work for the Dole
The largest part of the empirical evidence about the effectiveness of active labour market policies comes from the United States, where they clearly work best in helping sole parents return to the labour force and work badly in helping disadvantaged youth. Evidence from other countries does not contradict these conclusions (Martin, 2000) . families, but unemployment also "leads to losses of self-reliance, self-confidence and psychological and physical health" to quote Sen, (1999, p.21) Sweden, where to quote one authority "requirements to participate in poorly rewarded pseudoemployment in order to qualify for public income support breeds cynicism, perversely encouraging young people to reject the entire benefit-to-work package" (Ryan,2001, p.82) .
Given that most participants in Work for the Dole enter the program only to avoid losing unemployment benefits, the success of the program is all the more remarkable. However, attitudes change during the course of the program and people 'dragged in kicking and screaming' come to find the experience worthwhile. After completing their 26 weeks, 77 per cent of participants rate the experience as very satisfactory or satisfactory (DEWRSB, 2000). Obviously, if what participants learnt was relevant to their career aspirations that was best, but some participants simply enjoyed learning even though they did not have a clear idea of the sort of work they wanted to do or whether what they were learning was or was not related to their career goals. For example, a single mother who had been at home for the last twenty years looking after her children was having an "absolute ball" in a woodwork project which she chose because she wanted to learn something "altogether different from anything I had done before…[Also] learning about power tools will be useful because I live alone".
Participants who were unhappy were those who felt they were not learning anything and could see no prospect of future employment. For example, a participant who said that he "hated coming here", wasn't learning anything because as he said "he knew how to do all this sort of work already"
Both work relevance and learning are important in terms of providing participants with the type of work experience they value. However, relevant work experience needs to be linked to learning, whereas learning on its own is sufficient. A participant a landscape gardening project in Adelaide is a good example. He would like an outdoor labouring job with similar work to that done on the project but was not enjoying the experience:" [t] here is nothing I like about the project…I have done all this sort of work before". Nevertheless, it is a good result by international standards, especially since the evidence suggests that Work for the Dole works best for youth and young adults. Disadvantaged youth and young adults are a group that it is notoriously hard to help and even helping 10 percent of such a group find jobs is very valuable, because long term unemployment is so disastrous to individuals and to society. The stakes are high.
Some argue that Work for the Dole does not help participants find jobs at all, and probably does more harm than good. The most quoted study reaching this conclusion is Borland and Yi-Ping Tseng (2004) . There are a number of reasons that make this study less than convincing. First, while there is no completely suitable data to calculate the net extent to which Work for the Dole succeeds in helping participants find jobs, the data used has easily identifiable problems. Some stem from the fact that the study only related to volunteers, who are more likely to become attached to the program and hence slacken job search activity.
Others were technical problems due to the nature of the FACS' data that was used. Borland and Yi-Ping Tseng apparently do not think either type of problem important but ignoring them reduces the value of the study. Even more important than the data used is the fact that the study was of the pilot project which finished over five years ago. Since then the Work for the Dole program has changed in many ways. Irrespective of arguments about the data, the Borland and Yi-Ping Tseng study is simply no longer relevant because it is out of date. Work for the Dole does on balance have a positive employment assistance effect.
Why Work for the Dole works (a) The commitment of organisations and their staff
Helping participants find employment is not a formal objective of Work for the Dole.
However, most CWCs and Sponsors do have this as an implicit aim, and the encouragement, support and assistance they give participants is aimed at increasing their chance of getting a job. Some go to extraordinary lengths to help participants get a job. An extreme example is that of a participant who was missing a fair number of front teeth.
To quote the CWC involved
We decided he wouldn't get employed with all his front teeth missing so we wrote to the government dental service asking if we could get him fast-tracked because it was holding him back from employment. We finished up subsidizing his false teeth and he is now a very well presented young man [who is now employed].
Many, many other examples could be given of CWCs and Sponsors providing participants with more help in finding jobs than the program demands, though a number reported that with increasing financial stringency it is becoming increasingly difficult to do as much as they used to. Nevertheless, the general level of commitment is impressive. One simple indication of this is the response to the postal survey that we sent out to all CWCs and a sample of independent sponsors. It was sent out only once, with a one-page covering letter and no follow up. The response rate was between 60 and 70 percent. This shows a very high level of commitment to making Work for the Dole work. Normally, one would expect a response rate of about 20 percent for a postal survey with no follow up.
(b) A work experience program
Responses to questions in interviews strongly suggest that another reason for the success of Work for the Dole is because it is a work experience program. A very small minority of Work for the Dole participants volunteer because they know that they can work on a project which will give them the type of work experience that is required in the job they seek. Others choose to satisfy mutual obligation requirements through Work for the Dole for the same reason. However, the large majority of participants do not fall into either of these two categories. For the majority of those who obtain jobs, the major factor is that work experience not only gives them a chance to acquire skills and show their abilities and motivation to potential referees, but also incorporates them into an informal network, through which people hear about potential jobs and are considered seriously because they (or their referees) are members of that network. 
(d) Training
The role of training in work for the dole is ambiguous, but to some extent it plays a role in the success of the program. believe that more up-front training will increase the effectiveness of participants' work experience, both from the participants' point of view and from that of the organisations sponsoring projects. However, it is widely believed that projects with a substantial training component are unlikely to be regarded favourably by DEWR.
The right to training credits after completion 4 is helpful, but it would be better if training credits could be made available on a pro-rata basis, say after 8 weeks' work on a project had been completed. The importance of training credits has been reduced with the introduction of Job Network Members' Job Seeker Accounts, but it is still the case that in most cases neither form of access to money for training is available until someone has been on benefits for at least 12 months.
Participants are a diverse group and the amount of training that they desire, or can benefit from, varies greatly. At one end of the spectrum are graduates from the tertiary education system who may need work experience, but not more training. At the other end are those who believe they have little ability to acquire book learning and are bored at TAFE courses because 'everything is theory'. In between are the majority of participants who desire accredited training, including some relevant theory, as an aid in getting a job or furthering their career aspirations. While the training that is provided is valuable to many participants, this is an area where much more could be done, some without any extra cost to the Government.
Weaknesses (a) Underestimating what Work for the Dole can do
The book contains 14 recommendations about ways to improve the effectiveness of the Work for the Dole program, but I will start with a discussion of a situation that has developed since the book was written. Nevile and Nevile (2003 pp. 21 and 22) Work for the Dole when they reach the mutual obligation legal requirement. To some small extent this may be happening, but typically referral to Work for the Dole does still seem to be regarded as a routine requirement which people must go through in the 12 months that usually elapse before they are eligible for intensive support through customised assistance. Too many people still think of Work for the Dole solely in terms of mutual obligation and a way whereby unemployed engage in projects of value to the community. DEWR should work harder at selling the strengths of Work for the Dole as an active labour market program which complements the Job Network and is a valuable method of helping unemployed find jobs.
(b) Effects of multiple objectives
The lack of wholehearted acceptance of Work for the Dole as an integral and important part of the collection of policies that help unemployed find jobs no doubt stems from the multiple objectives of the program. Apart from the limited amount of money spent on the program, these multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives are the major source of weakness. It is not unusual for government programs to have conflicting objectives, if only because they are often required to fulfill unstated political objectives as well as policy objectives. In the case of Work for the Dole, not only are the unstated political objectives particularly strong, both the political objectives and aspects of the formal goals make it more difficult to achieve the informal goal of helping participants find jobs.
This problem is well known in other policy areas. For example, in macro-economic policy the conflict between reducing unemployment and keeping the ratio of inflation low is set out clearly in good textbooks, but there are also unstated political objectives such as increasing government expenditure or accumulating unspent funds to enable the government to announce tax cuts or avoid interest rate rises before elections.
In the case of Work for the Dole, an obvious example of unstated political objectives is the name of the program. The majority of the voting public like the idea of unemployed people, particularly the younger unemployed, being required to "do something" in return for government assistance (Eardley, Saunders and Evans 2000) , an attitude which is reinforced by the name of the program. However, use of the word 'dole' with its strong association with the phrase 'dole bludger' stigmatizes participants by reinforcing negative stereotypes of the unemployed, thereby reducing participants' self-esteem, motivation and pride in their work.
Use of the name 'Work for the Dole' also works against the program's community benefit objectives because the negative connotations surrounding the name makes it harder for CWCs to recruit sponsors.
However, the most important example is that, because the program was designed as a way that the unemployed could do something for the community in return for their benefits, projects have to be in the not-for-profit sector. This is reinforced, of course, by the opposition of many, in both business and the union movement, to extending it to allow projects in the forprofit sector. Requiring those organisations which run projects to be not-for-profit prevents many participants from gaining the type of work experience that they desire and would suit their vocational needs. For example, a number of male participants said they would like to get into security work (which they saw as a growth industry) but there were no Work for the Dole projects in this area because community organizations are not involved in this sort of work.
Staff also felt that participants' job prospects would be improved if they had the opportunity to work in the private sector. As one said:
'one of the things that participants always ask is, 'am I going to get a job out of this?' Honestly you can say there is a possibility…but it is hard when you are putting people in not-for-profit organizations. They are organizations which are cash strapped. They work with volunteers. If you are working with the corporate sector, you probably have more chance of gaining employment." Even in work experience areas which suit participants' needs, the not-for-profit restriction can limit the value of the work experience. For example, participants involved in projects which rebuild old computers donated by organizations and individuals which are then given to not-for-profit organizations, pointed out that the skills they are able to acquire through the project are limited by the out-of-date equipment with which they work.
"It would be better if we had slightly newer computers because then you would have experience with the up-to-date computers used in the workforce. It is easier to get a job if you have knowledge of up-to-date computers."
Hence, the first of the 14 recommendations in the book was:
"A pilot scheme be introduced in which, at the end of 26 weeks in a spell (or spells) in Work for the Dole, participants can (if recommended by their supervisor), volunteer for six months work, for four or five days a week, in the for-profit sector. The
Commonwealth Government would pay participants' wages for two of the days and the employer for the remainder" (Nevile and Nevile, 2003, p.159) .
In reviewing such a pilot scheme, attention must be paid to whether participants have the opportunity to learn new skills or whether the pilot scheme proves to be only an arrangement whereby employers can obtain cheap subsidized labour on a revolving basis.
Extending the work experience available through Work for the Dole in this way will benefit the longer-term unemployed who have done a number of Work for the Dole projects and are therefore not learning any new skills, will provide an incentive for those participants, who are unable to find a project which is relevant to their career aspirations, to persevere with the initial Work for the Dole project and will help older workers who need to be re-trained in a different type of work but are better to suited to on the job training than formal classroom learning.
Conclusion
By far the most important cause of social exclusion from Australian society is chronic involuntary joblessness. Building capacities that, among other things, help people obtain and keep a job is very worthwhile. However, unless the number of workers that employers wish to employ is increasing, building capacities will only have a marginal effect on reducing
